Devoutness to Islam and the Attitudinal Acceptance of Political Violence Among Young Muslims in Germany by Hadjar, Andreas et al.
1Political Psychology, Vol. 0, No.  0, 2018
doi: 10.1111/pops.12508
0162-895X © 2018  The Authors Political Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Society of Political Psychology
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, 
and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
Devoutness to Islam and the Attitudinal Acceptance of Political 
Violence Among Young Muslims in Germany
Andreas Hadjar
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
David Schiefer
Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), Berlin, Germany
Klaus Boehnke
Jacobs University Bremen, Germany
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation
Wolfgang Frindte
Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany
Daniel Geschke
Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft – Thüringer Dokumentations- und Forschungsstelle 
gegen Menschenfeindlichkeit, Jena, Germany
This article investigates the links between religious beliefs and capitalist mentalities—namely devoutness to 
Islam and hierarchic self-interest (HSI)—and violence-accepting attitudes among the young Muslim migrant 
population in Germany. Following a situational perspective, these links are analyzed under different 
individual conditions structured by (socioeconomic) precariousness and education. Based on framing 
approaches and concepts from socialization theory, we derive the following hypothesis: The links between 
religious beliefs and capitalist mentalities and the attitudinal acceptance of violence are stronger among 
individuals with low levels of education and a precarious economic status (compared to high education/
nonprecarious status). The strongest link is expected for a negative status inconsistency (high education/
precarious economic status). Structural equation models for data from a random probability sample of 350 
Muslims (aged 14–32 years) in Germany indicate that attitudinal acceptance of violence among young 
Muslims is not predicted by devoutness to Islam but by economic precariousness and by acceptance of 
capitalist values of the HSI belief system.
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Political discourse all over the Western world often suggests a general association of Muslim 
religiosity with the use of violence (Halm & Meyer, 2013; van der Noll, 2010). The current study 
attempts to challenge this widespread preconception by showing that among young Muslims attitu-
dinal support for violence is less straightforward. Rather it seems determined by the interplay of 
individuals’ dispositional characteristics and their living conditions. We focus on violence-accepting 
attitudes, defined here as attitudes attributing legitimacy to the use of political violence as a means 
of solving social conflict (Uslucan, Fuhrer, & Rademacher, 2003).1 The present study reports data 
from a random probability sample of 14–32-year-old Muslims in Germany (Frindte, Boehnke, 
Kreikenbom & Wagner, 2012). This adolescent and younger adult sample allows for an analysis of 
the links between devoutness to Islam and hierarchic self-interest (HSI) in predicting attitudinal 
acceptance of political violence (e.g., Hadjar [2004] in regard to HSI; Silke [2008], Simon & Ruhs 
[2008], or Hanke, van Egmond, Rohmann, & Boehnke [2017] in regard to Islamic extremism). The 
study concentrated on younger Muslims, as this age group is often seen as most likely to engage in 
delinquent and violent behavior (Moffitt, 1993; Paloutzian & Park, 2013) and also shows highest 
rates of acceptance of political violence (Trécourt, 2017).
Two basic assumptions are formulated: First, attitudes (such as violence-accepting attitudes) are 
structured by the basic belief systems individuals hold. According to Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
(Festinger, 1957), individuals strive for cognitive consonance and, thus, adhere to attitudes and be-
havioral intention patterns that fit the basic beliefs they hold. A general conceptual framework to 
theorize the mediating function of beliefs on deviance and violence is provided by framing models. 
Second, whether or not these beliefs lead to a particular behavioral intention is determined by social 
conditions, that is, socioeconomic characteristics of individual life circumstances.
We investigate two kinds of belief systems: A strongly self-centered Western-capitalist and a 
religious one, namely hierarchic self-interest (HSI)—a belief system that captures a self-centered 
orientation toward succeeding in highly competitive societies—and devoutness to Islam—a strong 
dedication of individuals to Islamic religious teachings. We test the assumption that the relationship 
between belief systems and attitudinal acceptance of violence is moderated by life circumstances, 
which we operationalize using educational attainment and the degree of socioeconomic precarious-
ness prevalent in individuals’ lives.
The subsequent theoretical sections will first introduce the Muslim immigrant group under 
scrutiny, followed by an elaboration of the theoretical link between belief systems (i.e., HSI and 
devoutness to Islam) and violence-accepting attitudes and an explanation of the assumption of a 
possible interaction with life circumstances.
Muslim Youth in Germany
Analyses presented below center on young Muslims (ages 14–32) in Germany, an economically 
prosperous high GDP country with a medium score on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (at the 
time of the survey in 2011: 60; compared to Sweden with a better integration score of 80; CIDOB/
MPG, 2015). Well over four million Muslims currently live in Germany, which constitutes more than 
5% of the total population. Roughly 60% of Muslims in Germany are of Turkish origin, followed by 
immigrants from Southeastern European countries (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania), the Middle East, and 
North Africa (Haug, Müssig, & Stichs, 2009).2 Most Muslims living in Germany are Sunni (74%), 
1Note that it is not violent behavior per se that is investigated in this study but rather attitudes towards violence. Although 
empirically related, both the acceptance and actual performance of violence are not identical. The step from attitudinal 
preferences to actual behavior is not at the core of this study. We see attitudes as roots of behavioral intentions that need 
certain situational specifics to manifest in actual behavior (cf. Theory of Planned Behavior; Ajzen, 2002).
2 Considering that more than one million refugees came to Germany in the year 2015, these figures are under constant 
change.
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followed by Alevi (13%) and Shiites (7%). On average, Muslims are more religious than Christians 
(Brettfeld & Wetzels, 2007; Haug et al., 2009). However, Muslims in Germany are still a rather het-
erogeneous group also in terms of religiosity. From a socioeconomic perspective, however, the 
Muslim population in Germany is rather uniformly underprivileged in terms of education, employ-
ment rates, and income levels (Brettfeld & Wetzels, 2007; SVR, 2010). They furthermore face quite 
dismissive attitudes by the German non-Muslim population. This rejection by many Germans is 
based on the claim that Muslims do not integrate well in terms of assimilation, plus a perceived 
generalized association of Islam with terrorism (Frindte et al., 2012; Heeren & Zick, 2012). Anti-
Muslim propaganda is at the heart of right-wing populist campaigns (Ormsby, 2017). Of all European 
countries that in their current borders never—even in part—belonged to the Ottoman Empire, 
Germany is at the top in Europe with 5–10% resident Muslims (PEW Research Center, 2015) to-
gether with Austria, Belgium, France, Liechtenstein, and the Netherlands.
In mere numbers, the prevalence of accepting violent means of political action is somewhat 
higher among Muslims in Germany compared to Christians and the German general population 
(e.g., Baier & Pfeiffer, 2012; Mayer, Fuhrer, & Uslucan, 2005), although only a small minority of 
these Muslims can be described as “Islamic-authoritarian” and pronouncedly prone to accept violent 
means of political action (about 12%; Brettfeld & Wetzels, 2007). These higher numbers seem to 
emerge from an interplay of the above mentioned socioeconomic disadvantage and discrimination, 
the general challenges of growing up between two cultures with different basic religious orientations, 
intergenerational conflict, and cultural aspects such as specific parental styles or traditional images 
of masculinity (e.g., Baier & Pfeiffer, 2012; Mayer et al., 2005; Uslucan, Liakova, & Halm, 2011).
The Link Between Belief Systems and Attitudinal Acceptance of Violence: 
Hierarchic Self-Interest and Devoutness to Islam
We will focus on how education and precariousness impact the link between belief systems 
and attitudinal acceptance of violence in terms of the situation-specific activation of certain frames: 
Framing approaches, thus, guide the formulation of our hypotheses. According to such concepts 
(e.g., Goffman, 1974), individuals’ experience with and perception of the surrounding world is or-
ganized by—or framed by—certain belief systems they hold. Such frames structure the evaluation 
of a situation and respective action alternatives. Hence, frames are closely linked to more concrete 
attitudes and subsequent behavior. People perceive, evaluate, and cope with a certain situation based 
on particular frames that structure “the situation by providing the criteria for selecting and ordering 
the alternatives” (Lindenberg, 1992, p. 12). Characterized by relative stability and abstractness, be-
liefs frame the selection of attitudes which then preform behavioral intentions and—under certain 
conditions—behavior (Ajzen, 2002).
In that respect, certain frames or belief systems can also increase or decrease the likelihood 
of choosing an action alternative that includes violence or crime. According to the framing model 
of Social Action Theory (Wikström & Sampson, 2006), orientations or social values are employed 
as frames for the selection of an action alternative. For example, if individuals internalized moral 
beliefs that condemn crime, then positive attitudes toward crime and criminal behavioral patterns 
are no longer taken into account or are actively dismissed. The current study contrasts two different 
belief systems assumed to structure violence-related attitudes: The Western-capitalist belief system 
of HSI and devoutness to Islam in terms of their relation to the attitudinal acceptance of violent 
political behavior.
Hierarchic self-interest (HSI) has been conceptualized as an individual expression of societal 
dominance ideologies and a core belief pattern of modern industrial societies and is strongly tied to 
the logic of free-market capitalism. HSI as a self-centered belief system encompasses the notions 
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that being successful in all life domains is of primary importance, that success can only be reached 
by outperforming rivals, that individualism is a main prerequisite for success, and that it is also 
legitimate to reach success through violating the interests of others (Hadjar, 2004; Hadjar, Baier, & 
Boehnke, 2008; Hagan, Hefler, Claßen, Boehnke, & Merkens, 1998).
HSI comprises several subdimensions (cf. Hadjar, 2004; Hagan et al., 1998). For the following 
analyses, we confine HSI to four elements: Competitiveness is linked to Festinger’s (1954) Social 
Comparison Theory and describes the wish to be better than others that arises from comparisons 
with others. It reflects the hierarchic structure of a (capitalist) society, perceived differences in suc-
cess, status and wealth, and positional competition (Hirsch, 1977). Success orientation refers to the 
urge for effectiveness in working or learning processes and the impulse to produce material assets. 
It is linked to the materialism concept of Inglehart (1977). Machiavellianism describes a set of at-
titudes and behaviors intended to put through ones’ own goals also at the expense of the interests 
of others (Machiavelli, 1531/2014). Individualism relates to concepts of modernized societies that 
emphasize the individual as the key unit of the contemporary world over the importance of the group 
or larger units (Bell, 1973). Individual goals are far more important than group goals (cf. Triandis, 
1995).
The unique and innovative characteristic of the HSI concept is that it is located at the interface 
of psychological and sociological approaches to the emergence of human attitudes and behavior. On 
the one hand, it is an individual-difference variable that describes a certain aspect of an individual’s 
personality (beliefs about “proper” individual behavior in a social system). On the other hand, it de-
scribes individual expressions of dominance ideologies prevalent in modern industrial societies (i.e., 
the logic of free market capitalism). These ideologies provide a frame for individual’s attitudes and 
behavior such as the acceptance of violence.
Numerous authors have come to call this type of belief “idiocentric” (e.g., Dutta-Bergman & 
Wells, 2002). HSI does not refer to an autonomous individuality that is positively linked to univer-
salism or postmaterialism; it is rather an expression of a highly self-centered and in essence antiso-
cial individualism. The preference of HSI beliefs is negatively associated with parenting practices 
directed to increase autonomous individuality (Hadjar, 2004).
Whereas HSI is a distinctly Western-capitalist belief, very much linked to rationalization pro-
cesses, devoutness to Islam is an expression of religious beliefs. Devoutness can be considered as 
one specific dimension of religiosity, which in turn can be described as the “state of one’s belief in 
God, characterized by his piety and religious zeal” (Salleh, 2011, p. 266). Lenski (1961) describes 
devotionalism (which resembles devoutness) as one of four dimensions of religiosity. It refers to a 
high degree of religiousness and piety. The sacral and the secular world are seen as one, and the re-
ligious perspective (thoughts, beliefs, and laws) is applied to all realms of the societal and individual 
everyday life as well as to all decisions and actions. Although devoutness is part of all religions, its 
expression can differ across religions; thus, its measurement needs to be adapted to the religion that 
is focused on (e.g., Salleh, 2011).
Why Do Hierarchic Self-Interest and Devoutness to Islam Relate to the 
Attitudinal Acceptance or Rejection of Violence?
First, holding beliefs of HSI involves self-assertiveness, self-enforcement, competition, self-cen-
tered individualism, and the idea of hierarchy and dominance as a valuable state (resembling modern 
market economies). Such beliefs are “in harmony with and conducive to criminality” (Sutherland, 
1947, p. 73; see also Hagan et al., 1998) since they include antisocial rationalizations that legitimize 
and build the base for amoral behavior in terms of crimes. Furthermore, moralistic beliefs (i.e., 
religious values) which potentially prevent the individual from violence and other crimes can be 
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downplayed by such beliefs, a mechanism of “neutralization” as conceptualized by Sykes and Matza 
(1957). A person who perceives him- or herself “as an autonomous individual with the powers of 
reason and free choice” and who is characterized by “economic self-interest and the effort to sur-
pass their fellows in the accumulation of wealth and status” (Coleman, 1987, p. 414) is very likely to 
commit offenses as long as this person finds a specific reason for the offense. Empirical evidence 
from previous studies supports this assumption. HSI is highly correlated with xenophobic attitudes, 
has proven to be a predictor of risky behavior and delinquency, and mediates the influence of other 
variables on delinquency (Hadjar, 2004; Hadjar et al., 2008; Hagan et al., 1998).
The devoutness-violence link has more frequently been systematically examined with regard 
to Christian rather than Muslim religiosity (cf., Baier & Pfeiffer, 2012). Furthermore, contemporary 
accounts of Islam and violence do not focus on political violence in general terms but on suicide 
bombing or membership in radical organizations (Hafez, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2005). As the content 
of religions differs (and also the implications of this content in different territorial and cultural con-
texts), theory and empirical results in regard to Christian religions cannot simply be applied to Islam. 
Thus, we will base our arguments mainly on the content of Islam, the context of Muslim immigrants 
in Germany, and on findings from terrorism studies. What has been theorized and empirically tested 
with regard to Christian religiosity will only play a minor role.
Two arguments guide our research on the link between religiosity and attitudinal acceptance 
of violence. The first argument assumes a lower level of crime and violence among more religious 
individuals. Religious devoutness—conceptualized here as a belief system and frame of action that 
refers to religion and God as an objective truth—determines an individual’s attitudes and behaviors 
since a higher degree of devoutness goes along with a higher importance of religious values and 
motives (cf. Salleh, 2011). Although religious values do not automatically include a condemnation of 
delinquency and violence, in general, religious devoutness can be seen as a proxy for a high moral-
ity that prevents people to consider action alternatives that contradict these moral values. In regard 
to Islam, peace (on earth and of mind) is one of the fundamental goals (Bouhdiba & Al-Dawalibi, 
1998). In his analysis of the Qu’ran, Aydin (2011) emphasizes that Islam (like other religions) is in its 
principles a religion of peace and salvation and that verses in the Qu’ran suggest the opposite (e.g., 
jihad verses) are often misinterpreted and taken out of the context.
From a sociological perspective, it is even more important to see how Muslims interpret their 
religion: The study of Kurzman (2011) shows that—particularly in a Western context—the great 
majority of Muslims lives a peaceful life and does not support terrorist groups. Empirical studies of 
the Pew Research Center reveal that “Muslims around the world strongly reject violence in the name 
of Islam” (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 29) and that in countries with large Muslim populations 
(e.g., Lebanon, Indonesia, Pakistan, Palestine) the so-called Islamic State (ISIL) is only supported 
by small minorities that do not exceed more than 15% of the population in any researched country 
(Poushter, 2015).
According to control theory (Hirschi, 1969), religious devoutness is strongly linked to higher 
control levels. To devote one’s life to religion and religious moral values means to control one’s be-
havior and being socially controlled much more than others. Furthermore, the Theory of Differential 
Learning (Sutherland, 1947) argues that a religious environment may guarantee the transmission 
of moral religious values and enforce that behaviors are oriented toward these values. In religious 
environments, contacts to peers who share (nonviolent) moral beliefs condemning delinquency and 
violence are more likely than contacts to delinquent offenders (cf. Baier & Pfeiffer, 2012). For de-
voutness to Christianity, a crime-reducing impact of religion is almost universally backed empiri-
cally (cf. meta-analyses by Baier & Wright, 2001; Johnson, De Li, Larson, & McCullough, 2000); 
evidence by Brettfeld (2009), who studied Muslim adolescents, suggests that Islamic religiosity also 
reduces violence, although the link is weaker.
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The second argument dominating research and public discourse—the assumption of a positive 
correlation between Muslim beliefs and violence—is drawn from the increasing scientific interest 
in Islamist extremism, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Some of those studies provide evidence 
that an extremist Islamic attitude pattern, which includes the acceptance of violence for the sake of 
defending or preserving Islam (e.g., Goli & Rezaei, 2010) is correlated with a higher devoutness to 
Islam (e.g., Brettfeld & Wetzels, 2007). There is also German evidence that a high Islamic religiosity 
among migrants, under certain conditions, goes along with a higher prevalence of violence (Baier & 
Pfeiffer, 2012). The mechanism behind these positive empirical links is not the fact that the Qu’ran 
is violent per se but rather that its verses are interpreted and communicated by a minority of Muslim 
fundamentalists in a way that it can serve the Muslim community as a frame for the legitimization of 
violent behavior (cf. e.g., Schreiber, 2017). Such messages, in turn, might reach especially those who 
are strongly devoted to Islam, since they are more prone to take Qu’ran verses literally. Hafez (2006), 
thus, even claims a general (positive) link between religion and a culture of violence: “Religious no-
tions of martyrdom and self-sacrifice have inspired violent campaigns in all religious traditions and 
can promote extreme violence” (p. 169), particularly in the aftermath of 9/11 (e.g., Stenski, 1993).
Taking these ambivalent, empirically backed arguments together, a strong devoutness to Islam 
together with a support of radical Islamist ideologies (including tolerance of violence in support of 
the Islam community) is a pattern that exists among a small minority of Muslims and is induced by 
background factors—in terms of a “misappropriation of religious labels for violent ends” (Awan, 
2008, p. 13). Moreover, the strong devoutness to Islam among Islamist extremists often developed 
rapidly over a comparably short period of time (Awan, 2008; Silke, 2008). Finally, violence-accept-
ing messages of Islamist ideologues might reach Muslims with a strong devoutness to Islam more 
easily than those with a weaker devoutness. Hence, the association seems stronger with regard to a 
subgroup and specific conditions, not the general population of Muslims.
Given the stronger empirical support of the violence-reducing effect of religiosity, and consid-
ering the argument that a link between devoutness to Islam and extreme Islamist ideologies that 
involve the acceptance of violence are a qualitatively different phenomenon of a small minority of 
Muslims, we stick to the argument of a delinquency- and violence-preventing role of devoutness.
Individual Life Conditions and the Link Between Beliefs and Violence-Accepting Attitudes
One of the core propositions of this study is that the link between Western-capitalist and reli-
gious beliefs and violence-accepting attitudes differs in its strength depending on the individual’s 
life circumstances. We investigate (1) the level of individual economic status, (2) the level of educa-
tion, and (3) the interaction between education and economic status as moderators of the link be-
tween individual beliefs (HSI, devoutness) and acceptance of violence.3 Following Framing Theory 
(e.g., Lindenberg, 1992), beliefs in terms of frames are only employed when they fit a certain situa-
tional context. From that perspective, it is argued that both the socioeconomic situation people live 
in and their educational level have an impact on the frames people use. Whether or not HSI (in terms 
of Western-capitalist beliefs in the culture of competition) and devoutness to Islam (in terms of a 
religious worldview) are activated as frames and translate into violence-accepting attitudes de-
pends—so our assumption—on the situation individuals live in.
With regard to the socioeconomic situation, several authors and theories have emphasized its 
importance for the prevalence of certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. In his study on the attrac-
tiveness of radical violent Muslim groups, Wiktorowicz (2005), for example, argued that experiences 
3 While in this study we only focus on moderation effects, some approaches and empirical accounts also suggest direct ef-
fects between life conditions, belief systems, and violence-accepting attitudes. We do not neglect these accounts as they add 
a more holistic picture to our moderation focus.
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of precarious conditions like discrimination, socioeconomic crisis, or political repression may lead 
to a change in beliefs that are more radical and allow for the use of violence. This perspective is sup-
ported by more general theoretical approaches such as the contemporary account of Authoritarianism 
Theory by Oesterreich (2005) or Stellmacher and Petzel (2005): Authoritarian beliefs are activated 
when social threats—in terms of precarious life conditions—are perceived. People compensate for 
critical situations and insecurities resulting from different kinds of threats by sticking to a simple 
authoritarian worldview that provides rigid answers, clarity, and orientation.
With regard to the activation of religious beliefs, deprived and stressed individuals urge for 
rigid, predictable rules and therefore feel in need of religious guidelines or pseudo-religious dog-
matic value systems, while “people raised under conditions of relative security can tolerate more 
ambiguity and have less need for the absolute and rigidly predictable rules that religious sanctions 
provide” (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 19). Among those people lacking “existential security,” reli-
gion and other stable belief systems persist against the trend of secularization. Finally, Disintegration 
Theory (Anhut & Heitmeyer, 2008) argues that if a lack of integration is perceived regarding the 
access to goods, positions, or other integration dimensions, antisocial attitudes are activated and the 
risk of violence increases.
Education is assumed to weaken the link between belief systems and violence acceptance. A 
first reason for that assumption is that a higher educational level goes along with a higher socioeco-
nomic status. However, it is important to conceive of the impact of education and socioeconomic 
status as separate moderators. What separates social status and education as independent entities are 
cognitive skills. Higher levels of education mean more advanced competencies in recognizing, un-
derstanding, and reflecting everyday life, values, norms, and even stereotypes. Hopf’s (1999) argu-
mentation includes this cognitive argument but also goes beyond it by postulating that more highly 
educated people are: (1) Cognitively mobilized to a higher degree and thus stick to stereotypes to a 
lesser extent (cognitive complexity assumption), (2) have a higher social competence, since in higher 
educational institutions cooperation and perspective taking is a subject of schooling (social compe-
tence assumption), (3) show value preferences that are more distant to ethnocentrism and violence 
(value change assumption), and (4) spend more time in educational institutions and learn values and 
attitudes that are desired by mainstream society—e.g., less ethnocentric and violent orientations—
more deeply (conformity assumption). Furthermore, highly educated individuals have a higher level 
of self-control, more patience, and are more risk averse to returns for actions (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 
1990; Hansen, 2003; Lochner & Moretti, 2004).
Interaction of Socioeconomic Status and Education
Besides the effects of socioeconomic status and level of education per se, we assume an inter-
action of both aspects that moderates the link between HSI, devoutness to Islam, and the attitudinal 
acceptance of violence. In particular, we suggest that the strongest link between HSI/devoutness to 
Islam and attitudinal acceptance of violence should be expected for a condition of negative status 
inconsistency, that is, high educational attainment combined with low economic status. Negative 
status inconsistency occurs when there is no successful crystallization of education into (vocational) 
status and income (Lenski, 1954), in other words, when an investment into education did not pay 
off in terms of status and income (i.e., no adequate jobs, social position, or income level). Such an 
inconsistency is experienced as a certain kind of downward mobility and is likely to have negative 
consequences for attitudes and behavior, such as “stress symptoms, voting decisions, deviant be-
havior, suicide, social change” (Kohler, 2005, p. 237). Following this argument, we further specify 
the postulated moderation function of life conditions on the link between beliefs and acceptance of 
violence: Existing beliefs are activated and translate into attitudinal violence acceptance especially 
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under the condition of a negative status inconsistency. For HSI, this means that in a situation of 
negative status inconsistency, that frame must be assumed to gain a stronger impact on violence-ac-
ceptance, whereas for devoutness to Islam it must be assumed that the preventative role of religion 
is reduced.
Hypotheses
The main hypotheses derived from theoretical reasoning, and to be tested at p ≤ .05, read:
H1: Hierarchic self-interest and devoutness to Islam are linked to violence-accepting atti-
tudes among young Muslims in Germany.
H1a: Higher levels of hierarchic self-interest are associated with more attitudinal accep-
tance of violence.
H1b: Higher devoutness to Islam is associated with less attitudinal acceptance of violence.4
H2: The link between the beliefs and violence-accepting attitudes is stronger when Muslims 
live in a precarious economic situation.
H3: The link between the beliefs and violence-accepting attitudes is stronger when Muslims 
have only achieved a lower level of educational attainment.
H4: Violence-accepting attitudes are most strongly affected by beliefs when Muslims live 
in a situation of negative status inconsistency (higher educational attainment coupled with 
a precarious economic situation).
Method
Sample
The current study was part of a larger research project named “Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in 
Germany” (Frindte et al., 2012). One part of that study was a phone survey with young Muslims aged 
14–32 conducted between August and October 2010. Participants responded to a standardized ques-
tionnaire; interviews took about 30 min. Sampling was done by randomly dialing numbers selected 
from landline phone lists that had been screened by so-called onomastic methods (linguistically 
derived computer programs that offer a basis of assigning phone owners to a certain national/cultural 
background, thereby allowing a selection of phone owners with names prevalent in predominantly 
Muslim countries). The overall sample size was 350. Readers will find a thorough discussion of possi-
ble selection biases when sampling for phone interviews with young Muslims in Germany in Frindte 
et al. (2012) and Frindte (2013). Of course, it is unlikely that members of terrorist cells and their 
immediate supporters will have consented to participate in a phone interview. We must take this into 
consideration when interpreting results; however, at the same time, we believe that any quantitative 
study with voluntary participants will suffer from excluding extreme cases from the very beginning.
In order to avoid additional participation bias, the questionnaire was translated from German 
to Arabic and to Turkish (the two main languages spoken by Muslims in Germany, aside from 
4 We commence our empirical work with the assumption that findings for the relationship of Christian devoutness and vio-
lence acceptance also apply to the relationship of devoutness to Islam and violence acceptance.
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German), and interviewers were proficient in one of these languages. Participants were offered their 
choice of the language they would like to use for the interview. The onomastic definition of the 
population coupled with random probability sampling assured an adequate representation of the 
population of young Muslims in Germany at the time of the survey.
Instruments
A violence-accepting attitude was measured using the item “The Western threat towards the 
Muslim world justifies that Muslims defend themselves employing violence.” Respondents had to 
rate this item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (no agreement) to 5 (strong agreement). In our 
sample of young Muslims, the mean (2.44) for this variable is below the response-scale center. The 
standard deviation is rather high indicating a certain amount of heterogeneity within our sample of 
young Muslims (1.37). The other distribution parameters (skewness = 0.53; kurtosis = −0.91) indi-
cate that the variable is usable for parametric statistical data-analysis techniques.
The four dimensions of hierarchic self-interest were measured using well-studied items (cf. 
Hadjar, 2004; Hagan et al., 1998): Respondents rated the items on a scale ranging from 1 (no agree-
ment) to 5 (strong agreement). Competitiveness was measured by two items (internal consistency, 
Cronbach’s α = .65/2 items): “I would like to be among the best in all domains of life (job, school, 
sports, etc.)” and “It is always my ambition to be better than average”; success orientation by “The 
most important thing in life is achievement” and “People who don’t perform well won’t be happy” 
(α = .59/2 items). For Machiavellianism, the items “Winning is the most important thing in life, not 
how you win” and “Human actions should always be evaluated in terms of their success” were se-
lected (α = .45/2 items). (Self-centered) Individualism was also measured by two items: “We would 
all be better off if everyone would just look after themselves” and “To be superior, a man must 
stand alone” (α = .67/2 items). All four subscale means (first-order factors) fit into the second-order 
factor HSI with an internal consistency at α = .62 (HSI scale: Success orientation, competitiveness, 
Machiavellianism, individualism). We use factor scores of individuals on the second-order factor as 
our measure of HSI. A detailed exploration of the second-order structure of the HSI belief pattern 
is provided in confirmatory factor analyses reported elsewhere (Hadjar, 2004; Hagan et al., 1998). 
The factor scores of the second-order factor vary between −2.55 and 2.72; distribution parameters 
also allow parametric analysis being very close to a normal distribution with skewness and kurtosis 
coefficients very close to zero, .02 and −.02, respectively.
Devoutness to Islam was directly measured by asking participants how devotional (German: 
“fromm”) their family was, ranging from 1 (not at all devotional) to 5 (very devotional). Although 
the agreement to this devoutness item among the Muslim sample in Germany is rather high (M = 
3.77), the distribution of the variable is satisfactory for parametric statistical analysis (SD = 0.98; 
skewness = −0.31; kurtosis = −0.46).5
A precarious socioeconomic situation (precariousness) was operationalized via the self-re-
ported household net income of the family per month, taking into account the number of earners in 
the household. Respondents had to indicate household income as lying in one of seven categories, 
ranging from “under 500 €” via “1.700 to under 2.000 €” (as the middle category) to “3.200 € and 
more.” The variable was dichotomized into two categories by median split: (1) Precarious living 
conditions (from “under 500 €” up to 1999 € household income), (0) nonprecarious living conditions 
(2000 € and more). Educational level refers to the number of years in schooling. This variable also 
was dichotomized: (1) Stands for people who already passed or are on a school track leading to 
5 As the item refers to the family’s and not the individual’s devoutness, we conducted several validity checks. The item is 
positively associated with individual religious practices such as number of prayers yesterday (Spearman’s ρ = 0.37) and 
weekly number of mosque visits (Spearman’s ρ = .24).
10 Hadjar et al.
A-level education (upper secondary-school degree/high school diploma), (0) stands for people with 
a lower number of years in education or who are on a school track leading to less than an upper 
secondary-school degree.
Age was measured in years. Respondents were 14–32 years of age with a mean age of 20.78 (SD 
5.26). Gender was measured via the conventional dichotomous variable. The proportion of respon-
dents who reported a female gender in the sample is 51.9%.
Results
Before dealing with our hypotheses, first a look at the descriptive statistics (Table 1): The means 
of the central variables (HSI, devoutness to Islam, and acceptance of violence) differ more by level of 
educational attainment than by economic prosperity. HSI is lowest among Muslims with a high level 
of educational attainment living in good (nonprecarious) economic conditions and highest among 
Muslims with a low level of education and a precarious economic situation (income below average). 
Only the main education effect was significant at p ≤ .05, whereas the economic prosperity effect 
missed significance by a small margin (p ≤ .10).
Devoutness to Islam seems to be rather independent of both education and economic prosperity; 
neither of the two main effects nor their interaction were significant.
For acceptance of violence, the economic prosperity effect missed significance by a small mar-
gin (p ≤ .10). Once again the impact of education was highly significant and strong. The strongest 
acceptance of violence was found among double-deprived (low education/precarious economic sit-
uation) Muslims; the lowest acceptance level of violence was found for double-advantaged (high 
education, nonprecarious socioeconomic situation) Muslims.
As coefficients should only be compared between the four different groups when there is vari-
ance homogeneity regarding the dependent and independent variables, we computed Levene tests 
revealing that neither the variances of violence acceptance nor the variances of devoutness to Islam 
or HSI differ significantly between the four groups.
All hypothesis-related analyses were performed controlling for age and gender because theoret-
ical reflections (e.g., Uslucan et al., 2003) and preliminary analyses had shown that age and gender 
are related to all variables of interest to a nonnegligible degree, albeit to a different degree in the 
four groups under consideration (e.g., path coefficients of the links between age and acceptance of 
violence ranged from r = .00 to r = −.33).
Hypothesis 1 referred to the general links between HSI and devoutness to Islam and vio-
lence-accepting attitudes. Results of an OLS-regression model (using the whole sample; explained 
variance r2 = 0.66 indicated a low general explanatory power of the independent variables) showed 
a relatively strong positive association of HSI (ß = .24, p ≤ .001) with violence-accepting attitudes, 
but no significant association between devoutness to Islam (ß = .07, p = .178) and violence-accept-
ing attitudes. Considering controls, female gender appears to be associated with a lower attitudinal 
acceptance of political violence (ß = −.12, p ≤ .05), whereas for age no significant effect (ß = −.05, 
p = .390) emerged.
To investigate with more focus whether the link between the Western-capitalist frame (HSI) and 
the religious frame (devoutness to Islam) with violence-accepting attitudes is moderated by socio-
economic condition and level of education (H2–H4), we estimated multigroup structural-equation 
models (SEM) employing AMOS (see Figures 1–4). The usage of a SEM approach was favored over 
OLS regressions with pertinent interaction effects, because multigroup SEM analyses allow the 
simplest test of intergroup differences in the sizes of path coefficients. The four groups are charac-
terized by a certain coupling of levels of educational attainment and the degree of precariousness of 
their economic status. By estimating models for different groups, we were able to test for significant 
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differences among the groups regarding the link between beliefs (HSI and devoutness to Islam) and 
violence-accepting attitudes.
The models presented here are based on the respective covariance matrices and have been esti-
mated using maximum-likelihood estimation. All scales were introduced as manifest variables into 
SEM to optimize the ratio of (a generally low) number of cases (N) to number of variables. The path 
coefficients are to be interpreted like standardized regression weights, ranging from −1 for a perfect 
negative relationship through 0 for no relationship to +1 for a perfect positive relationship. Goodness-
of-fit coefficients show a good fit of the data to the hypothesized conceptual model: The multigroup 
model does fit the data in light of the χ2/df-ratio (χ2 = 4.471, df = 4, p = .346) indicating no significant 
difference between the hypothesized and the empirical model and the other goodness-of-fit indices 
(GFI = .996, AGFI = .938, RMSEA = .017, SRMR = .043; CFI = .998; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Sharma, 
Mukherjee, Kumar, & Dillon, 2005).
Among “double-deprived” Muslims—those who live in a precarious situation (income below 
average) and also have a low level of education—there was rather a strong relationship between HSI 
and violence-accepting attitudes. Family’s devoutness to Islam, in turn, did not have a significant 
impact on violence-accepting attitudes in this group; the path coefficient was, however, positive (see 
Figure 1).
Among the “double-advantaged” Muslims—those in a nonprecarious situation and with a high 
level of education—no significant impact of either HSI or devoutness to Islam on violence-accepting 
attitudes (with path coefficients being close to zero) emerged (Figure 2).
The next group under scrutiny is Muslims characterized by a positive status inconsistency: 
Low levels of education, but a nonprecarious life situation (above-average income). In this group, no 
significant links between the beliefs and a violence-accepting attitude were found. The path coeffi-
cients were positive, but far from significant (see Figure 3).
Finally, in the group with a negative status inconsistency (high education but low income), a 
strong link between the Western-capitalist frame HSI and acceptance of violence was found. Once 
again, devoutness to Islam was not significantly associated with violence-accepting attitudes in this 
group (Figure 4). Considering the explanatory power of the models, the independent variables (in-
cluding controls) explain most of the attitudinal acceptance of political violence in the conditions 
of “double deprivation” (R2 = 22%) and “negative status inconsistency” group (R2 = 19%), while 
explained variances are below 10% in the two remaining groups.
In order to offer a decision regarding our hypotheses, the coefficients of the link between HSI 
and acceptance of violence as well as between devoutness to Islam and acceptance of violence need 
to be statistically compared between the four groups.
As there is no significant relationship between devoutness to Islam and violence-accepting 
attitudes in any single case, such a comparison emerged as obsolete for that predictor: All four 
Figure 1. Belief-violence-accepting attitudes link for individuals with a low level of educational attainment and a precarious 
economic status (“double deprivation”). N = 76, standardized path coefficients (unstandardized path coefficients/standard 
errors); controlled for age and gender, factors represented by rectangles, since mean scores have been included. *p ≤ .05; 
**p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. Data Source. Research Project “Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in Germany” (Frindte et al., 2012).
13Acceptance of Political Violence
hypotheses must be rejected for devoutness to Islam; it does not predict violence-accepting attitudes. 
However, one is able to say that in none of the four cases is the relationship negative as assumed in 
Hypothesis 1b. To find no negative relationship in the four groups in binomial testing (expecting 
equal numbers of negative and positive signs a priori) has a probability of p = .063. One may thus 
Figure 2. Belief-violence-accepting attitudes link under the condition of high educational level/nonprecarious status 
(“double advantage”). N = 78, standardized path coefficients (unstandardized path coefficients/standard errors); controlled 
for age and gender, factors represented by rectangles, since mean scores have been included. *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
Data Source. Research Project “Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in Germany” (Frindte et al., 2012).
Figure 3. Belief-violence-accepting attitudes link for individuals with a low level of educational attainment and a 
nonprecarious economic status (“positive status inconsistency”). N = 74, standardized path coefficients (unstandardized 
path coefficients/standard errors); controlled for age and gender, factors represented by rectangles, since mean scores have 
been included. *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. Data Source. Research Project “Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in Germany” 
(Frindte et al., 2012).
Figure 4. Belief-violence-accepting attitudes link for individuals with a high level of educational attainment and a 
precarious economic status (“negative status inconsistency”). N = 98, standardized path coefficients (unstandardized path 
coefficients/standard errors); controlled for age and gender, factors represented by rectangles, since mean scores have 
been included. *p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. Data Source. Research Project “Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in Germany” 
(Frindte et al., 2012).
14 Hadjar et al.
be inclined to conclude that there is indeed little ground for assuming a validity of our assumption 
that devoutness to Islam is a protective factor against holding proviolence attitudes; this clearly is 
not the case.
Regarding the relationship between HSI and violence-accepting attitudes, the four groups under 
consideration indeed need to be compared. In Table 2, results of pairwise model comparisons are 
shown. The significance levels (p) indicate whether a restricted model assuming the path coeffi-
cients for the link between HSI and violence-accepting attitudes to be equal across groups causes a 
significant drop in the model fit compared to a nonrestricted model that allows the path coefficients 
to vary freely across groups. If the restricted model fits significantly worse to the data, the coeffi-
cients for the two groups compared can be assumed to differ significantly.
Results indicate two major differences: The “double-deprived” group (low educational level and 
precarious socioeconomic situation) does differ significantly in the strength of the link between HSI 
and violence-accepting attitudes from the “double-advantaged” group of Muslims (high educational 
level and nonprecarious economic situation; Comparison 1). However, whether or not economic sit-
uation or educational level is the main mechanism behind this difference can only be decided by 
looking at the other comparisons. Among individuals living in precarious conditions, there is no 
difference between those with high compared to those with low educational level. Hence, education 
level does not make a difference among people living under precarious conditions (Comparison 
2). Education also makes little difference among people living in nonprecarious conditions—here 
people with a low education level also do not differ from people with a high education level in the 
strength of the link between HSI and violence (Comparison 5). Furthermore, among individuals 
Table 2. Model Comparisons HSI Acceptance of Violence Link
Differences between restricted model and unrestricted 
model (restricted model: HSI-violence-accepting 
attitudes link does not vary between conditions) df CMIN p
Comparison 1: HSI-violence-accepting attitudes link of 
“double-deprived”a equals “double-advantaged”b
1 5.433 .020
Comparison 2: HSI-violence-accepting attitudes link of 
“double-deprived”a equals the one of those with 
negative status inconsistencyc
1 .333 .564
Comparison 3: HSI-violence-accepting attitudes link of 
“double-deprived”a equals the one of those with 
positive status inconsistencyd
1 .680 .410
Comparison 4: HSI-violence-accepting attitudes link of 
those with negative status-inconsistencyc equals the 
one of “double-advantaged”b
1 11.379 .001
Comparison 5: HSI-violence-accepting attitudes link of 
those with positive status inconsistencyd equals the 
one of “double advantaged”b
1 1.351 .245
Comparison 6: HSI- violence-accepting attitudes link of 
those with positive status-inconsistencyd equals the 
one for those of negative status inconsistencyc
1 1.995 .158
Data Source. Research Project “Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in Germany” (Frindte et al., 2012).
aLow educational level/precarious status.
bHigh educational level/nonprecarious status.
cHigh educational level/precarious status.
dLow educational level/nonprecarious status.
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with a low education level, living under precarious conditions (compared to living under nonprecar-
ious conditions) does not make a difference either (Comparison 3). Finally, among the more highly 
educated people, precariousness does indeed make a difference (Comparison 4), with the people in 
a deprived social status showing a stronger link between HSI and violence-accepting attitudes than 
people who are economically well off. Lastly, a comparison of people with a low educational level, 
but a nonprecarious state (people who experienced upward mobility), and people with a high educa-
tional level living under precarious conditions (people who suffer status inconsistency) does not re-
veal any difference regarding the link between HSI and violence-accepting attitudes (Comparison 6).
Conclusions and Discussion
The main aim of the current study was to explore the links between both Western-capitalist and 
religious beliefs and violence-accepting attitudes among young Muslims in Germany and how these 
are moderated by living conditions. Considering the findings, there is antipopulist news: A family’s 
devoutness to Islam is not associated with violence-accepting attitudes measured as the degree of 
legitimacy attributed by Muslims to the use of violence for political reasons. This also applies to 
Muslims who live under precarious conditions and who have a low level of education. Whereas the 
religious frame of devoutness to Islam shows no impact on violence-accepting attitudes (no support 
at the same time for H1b that it should have a protective effect against violence-accepting attitudes), 
the strongly self-centered frame—hierarchic self-interest—is, under certain conditions, clearly 
linked to the attitudinal acceptance of political violence (support for H1a). Such conditions include 
the conditions of “double deprivation,” namely having a low income level and a low education level, 
and experiencing a “negative status inconsistency,” that is, a high education level and a low income 
level. In support for Hypothesis 2, results indicate that the link between HSI and violence-accepting 
attitudes is stronger (and only there of statistical significance) when Muslims live in a precarious 
economic situation, whereas the level of educational attainment did not make a difference (no sup-
port for H3). Although, according to Hypothesis 4, the link between the beliefs and violence-accept-
ing attitudes was stronger when Muslims live in a situation of negative status inconsistency (higher 
educational attainment coupled with a precarious economic situation), the effect of the HSI belief on 
violence-accepting attitudes was about the same size as under the “double deprivation” condition.
Our results support the Disintegration Concept (Anhut & Heitmeyer, 2008) for the Western-
capitalist frame: Hierarchic self-interest is activated under deprived conditions and then goes along 
with a higher attitudinal acceptance of (political) violence. Regarding theoretical explorations on the 
link between religion and attitudinal acceptance of violence, results do not back populist views that 
a higher Muslim religiosity of the family is linked to violence, but they also do not support accounts 
in regard to religiosity (e.g., concepts of Hirschi [1969] for Christian religiosity) that suggest a lower 
violence proneness among religious people. In our study, we were able to show how the interplay be-
tween cultural factors (belief systems) as conceptualized by contemporary Islam researchers (Hafez, 
2006) and conditions in terms of structural factors is linked to violence-accepting attitudes. Results 
seem to be in line with the interpretation of Wiktorowicz’s findings (2005) that it is not the religion 
that drives people into attitudes of accepting violence as a means of political action (or prevents 
them from approving of it). Presumably, there are also direct or mediating effects of (socioeconomic) 
conditions on violence acceptance—as this article focused on moderation effects, these direct links 
may be subject to future research.
However, certain limitations of our study have to be taken into account: In line with Uslucan et 
al.’s (2011) assertion that acceptance of violence is not identical with engagement in violent behav-
ior, our findings cannot and must not be generalized to behavior, as our dependent variable clearly 
referred to attitudinal acceptance of political violence. Secondly, answers of more highly educated 
respondents are presumably more biased than other responses, since highly educated people will 
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know better which answers are politically correct. Third, survey responses may be subject to social 
desirability. Muslims may tend to state a high attachment to being a Muslim even in cases where 
they actually lead a secular life. Fourth, we used only one item in regard to family devoutness and, 
thus, covered only one aspect of religion. However, validity checks show that the used item is after 
all related to individual aspects of religion. Muslim youth still very much act in line with their 
family’s notion of religion (Paloutzian & Park, 2013). Fifth, due to a small sample size, we were 
not able to control for additional variables above and beyond age and gender (e.g., denomination 
of Islam such as Sunni, Alevi, Shiite) that impact the individual relationship to Islam as a crucial 
mechanism behind the devoutness to acceptance of political violence link and may be sources of 
biases. We performed a number of robustness checks including other control variables and leaving 
age or gender as controls out. Controlling for German citizenship (of the interviewed young Muslims 
as opposed to, for example, Turkish citizenship) does not change the results in regard to the paths 
under consideration. Finally, although the HSI concept also describes an aspect of an individual’s 
personality (individual differences in beliefs), future studies should investigate the role other person-
ality characteristics such as the Big Five dimensions (see, e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992) and how they 
potentially account for, mediate, or moderate the link between HSI, devoutness, and the attitudinal 
acceptance of violence.
In sum, the predictors of an attitudinal acceptance of violence among young Muslims do not 
seem to be linked to devoutness to Islam but to a capitalist belief system that is widely spread in the 
Western world, which is activated and translated into violence-accepting attitudes when people live 
under precarious living conditions. Our findings furthermore emphasize the importance of integra-
tion of immigrants into the labor market and the education system (see Kogan, Kalter, Liebau, & 
Cohen, 2011). Particularly a state of negative status inconsistency—when high educational attain-
ments did not result in higher economic wealth—seems to increase the likelihood of self-centered 
frames such as HSI being translated into violence-accepting attitudes. Hence, the key challenge 
is not only to provide Muslim immigrants with access to education but also with opportunities to 
transfer their educational degrees into status and income. Diminishing precarious living conditions 
among Muslims appears to be one step to reduce acceptance of violence or even violence itself. 
Obviously, the cherished latter conclusion does need further systematic research, as the current study 
only addressed young Muslim’s attitudinal stance vis-á-vis using violence in the political sphere.
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